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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 Justin Thompson appeals the 110-month sentence he received after pleading guilty 
to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine hydrochloride.  
For the following reasons, we will affirm the judgment of sentence. 
I. 
 We write solely for the parties and will therefore recount only those facts that are 
essential to our disposition.  On April 16, 2012, Thompson pleaded guilty to a 
superseding information that charged him with conspiracy to distribute and possess with 
intent to distribute an unspecified amount of cocaine hydrochloride in violation of 21 
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), and 846.  The parties agreed that Thompson was 
responsible for 300 to 400 grams of powder cocaine, and the Probation Office’s 
Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) accordingly assigned him a base offense level 
of 22.  PSR ¶ 17; see United States Sentencing Guideline (“U.S.S.G.”) § 2D1.1(c)(9).  
However, because Thompson had two prior controlled substance convictions, he was 
classified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).  PSR ¶ 23.  This enhancement 
increased his offense level from 22 to 32 and his criminal history category from III to VI, 
yielding an advisory Sentencing Guidelines range of 210 to 262 months of imprisonment.  
PSR ¶¶ 33, 54.  The range was reduced to 210 to 240 months pursuant to the 20-year 
statutory maximum.  PSR ¶ 54; see U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(c).  The PSR did not award a 
downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, on the basis that Thompson had 
incurred new criminal charges while under pretrial supervision. 
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 Thompson filed a sentencing memorandum in which he argued that he was 
entitled to a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility; moved for a 
downward departure based on his poor physical health (Thompson suffers from end-stage 
renal disease); and requested a downward variance from the career offender Guideline, 
on the grounds that any sentence within that range would “be significantly greater than 
necessary to address [his] conduct.”  Appendix (“App.”) 24.  Thompson also cited his 
physical condition and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities as factors to 
be considered under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  He requested a below-Guidelines sentence of 
30 months.   
 At Thompson’s sentencing hearing, which was conducted on May 2, 2013, the 
Government indicated that it would not object to an adjustment for acceptance of 
responsibility (reducing Thompson’s final offense level from 32 to 29).  Apparently 
misconstruing Thompson’s request for a variance from the career offender Guideline as a 
motion for downward departure,
1
 the Government further indicated that it would not 
object to a one-level decrease in Thompson’s criminal history category pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b).
2
  Thus, under the Government’s calculation, the correct advisory 
Guidelines range was 140 to 175 months (based on an offense level of 29 and a criminal 
                                              
1
 Specifically, the Government stated:  “[t]he Court, if it were to vary because it 
overstates it, you could only drop one criminal history category.  So he would go from a 
six to a five.  I don’t oppose that.”  Appendix (“App.”) 58. 
2
 Under § 4A1.3(b)(1), a downward departure “may be warranted” if “reliable 
information indicates that the defendant’s criminal history category substantially over-
represents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that the 
defendant will commit other crimes.”  However, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b)(3), a 
downward departure for career offenders may not exceed one criminal history category. 
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history category of V).  The Government characterized Thompson’s remaining § 3553(a) 
arguments as “very compelling,” App. 59, but stated that it would “defer to” the court’s 
determination of an appropriate sentence. 
 After hearing from both parties, the District Court stated that it would grant 
Thompson’s unopposed request for a downward adjustment based on acceptance of 
responsibility.  It further announced, “[w]ith regard to the health issues,” that it 
“intend[ed]” to “grant a departure both on health but also on sentencing disparity.”  App. 
60.  The court then sentenced Thompson to 110 months of imprisonment, three years of 
supervised release, and a $100 special assessment.  App. 61-62.  The court gave the 
following statement of reasons: 
The Court adopts the pre-sentence investigation report with the following 
changes:  The Court does grant him three points for acceptance of 
responsibility.  No count of conviction carries a mandatory minimum 
sentence.  The fine is waived because of the Defendant’s inability to pay. 
 The sentence varies from the [G]uideline range for the following 
reasons:  One, the Court has taken into account his renal failure, his overall 
health condition, the disparity in the sentencing between him and other 
Defendants as well as disparity from his previous sentence under his prior 
criminal history. 
 
App. 62-63 (emphases added).  The Government then reminded the court that it had not 
addressed whether Thompson’s criminal history category should be reduced from VI to 
V.  The District Court responded: 
Yes.  The Court also believes consideration should be given to a variance 
based on the career offender status as it overstates the criminal history and 
the likelihood that the Defendant will commit future crimes.  Two prior 
convictions were minor drug offenses and also the fact that his previous 
history compared to his present offenses are just so disparate that the Court 
feels that to give even the sentence under the amended history still over-
represents the penalty that he deserves in this case. 
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App. 66 (emphasis added).  In its written statement of reasons, the District Court 
indicated that the applicable Guideline range was 151 to 188 months, based on an offense 
level of 29 and a criminal history category of VI.  The court explained that a variance was 
warranted in light of Thompson’s low likelihood of recidivism.  Thompson timely 
appealed. 
II.
3
 
We review the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a district court's 
sentence for abuse of discretion.  Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).  We “take 
up the procedural review first, looking to see that the district court has committed no 
significant error.”  United States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008).  “If the 
sentencing decision passes that first stage of review, we then, at stage two, consider its 
substantive reasonableness.”  Id. 
At stage one, we “ensur[e] that the district court committed no significant 
procedural error.”  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (emphasis 
added) (quotation marks omitted).  In United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 
2006), this Court articulated that a sentencing court must:  (1) calculate the defendant’s 
Guidelines sentence “precisely” as it would have before Booker; (2) in doing so, formally 
rule on the motions of both parties and state on the record whether it is granting a 
departure and how that departure affects the Guidelines calculation (taking into account 
                                              
3
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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this Court’s pre-Booker caselaw); and (3) exercise discretion by separately considering 
the relevant § 3553(a) factors.  Id. at 247. 
If the sentence imposed is not procedurally unreasonable, we proceed to the 
substantive-reasonableness inquiry, which asks “whether the final sentence, wherever it 
may lie within the permissible statutory range, was premised upon appropriate and 
judicious consideration of the relevant factors.”  United States v. Doe, 617 F.3d 766, 770 
(3d Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).  We apply a deferential standard, affirming 
“unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that 
particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568. 
III. 
A. 
 Thompson’s first claim of procedural error is that the District Court failed to state 
its calculation of the applicable Guidelines range on the record during his sentencing 
hearing.  Thompson Br. 18.  Contrary to Thompson’s position, the District Court 
expressly adopted the PSR’s Guidelines calculation — a total offense level of 32 and a 
criminal history category of VI — “with the following changes:  The Court does grant 
[Thompson] three points for acceptance of responsibility.”  See App. 62-63.   Because the 
court calculated and applied the correct career offender range, it complied with the first 
step of the Gunter analysis. 
B. 
 Thompson next argues that the District Court failed to “formally rule on” his 
request that it “disregard” the career offender Guideline.  See Thompson Br. 18-19, 25.  
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Thompson emphasizes that, but for the court’s application of the career offender range, 
his total offense level of 19 and criminal history category of III would have yielded a 
Guidelines range of 37 to 46 months of imprisonment.  Thompson asks that we vacate his 
sentence and remand so that the sentencing court may “determine whether the compelling 
policy reasons warrant disregarding the [c]areer [o]ffender [G]uideline range in this 
case.”  Thompson Br. 25. 
We note, as an initial matter, that there is some confusion as to whether 
Thompson’s argument is within the framework of a motion for downward departure 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b)(1) or a request for a downward variance.  We “expressly 
distinguish between departures from the [G]uidelines and variances from the 
[G]uidelines.”  United States v. Brown, 578 F.3d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 2009).  Departures are 
enhancements of, or subtractions from, a Guidelines calculation “based on a specific 
Guidelines departure provision,” and they require a motion by the requesting party and an 
express ruling by the court.  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  Variances, by contrast, are 
“discretionary changes to a [G]uidelines sentencing range based on a judge’s review of 
all the § 3553(a) factors” and do not require advance notice.  Id. at 226.  Whether a 
district court has imposed a departure or a variance “has real consequences for an 
appellate court’s review”:  the former determination implicates step two of the Gunter 
analysis, whereas the latter affects step three.  Id.; see United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 
288, 308 (3d Cir. 2011). 
As previously discussed, while Thompson’s sentencing memorandum and 
statements at his sentencing hearing framed his argument as one for a variance, the 
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Government construed the argument as a motion for a departure under § 4A1.3.  
Compare App. 22-29, and App. 50-54, with App. 58.  Thompson compounded the 
resulting uncertainty by arguing on appeal that the District Court did not “formally rule 
on” his request that it decline to apply the career offender Guideline.  Thompson Br. 19, 
25.  Despite this semantic anomaly, Thompson’s argument is clearly based on principles 
of fairness and policy — not on a particular Guidelines provision.  We will accordingly 
consider his argument to be that the District Court erred at step three of the Gunter 
analysis by not granting his request for a variance pursuant to § 3553(a).
4
 
To comply with its step three obligations, a sentencing court must “produce a 
record sufficient to demonstrate its rational and meaningful consideration of the [18 
U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors.”  United States v. Begin, 696 F.3d 405, 411 (3d Cir. 2012).  
“The record as a whole must make clear that the district judge has considered the parties’ 
arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking 
authority.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  While the court need not “raise every 
conceivable issue on its own initiative,” id., it must “acknowledge and respond to” any 
“properly presented sentencing argument which has colorable legal merit and a factual 
                                              
4
 Even assuming that Thompson moved for a downward departure under § 4A1.3(b)(1), 
we would still find no procedural error under Gunter’s second step because the 
Government conceded at sentencing that the District Court could take Thompson’s 
argument into account in its sentencing decision.  App. 58-60; see United States v. 
Jackson, 467 F.3d 834, 839 (3d Cir. 2006) (observing that, while failure to rule on a 
Guidelines departure motion “would seem contrary to step two in Gunter,” we “would 
not remand for re-sentencing when the Government’s arguments to the district court 
concede[d] the plausibility of the downward departure” and thereby allowed the inference 
that the departure motion had been denied by the district court “in recognition of its 
ability to depart had it chosen to do so” (quotation marks omitted)).   
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basis,” United States v. Ausburn, 502 F.3d 313, 329 (3d Cir. 2007); cf. Jackson, 467 F.3d 
at 842 (“Merely reciting the § 3553(a) factors, saying that counsel’s arguments have been 
considered, and then declaring a sentence, are insufficient to withstand our 
reasonableness review.”).  “Where the record is inadequate, we do not fill in the gaps by 
searching the record for factors justifying the sentence.”  Ausburn, 502 F.3d at 331. 
In his sentencing memorandum, and at his sentencing hearing, Thompson argued 
that the court was not “[b]ound” to accept the career offender range, and that it should not 
do so given the nature of his criminal history.  See App. 22-28, 51-53.  The record 
reflects that the District Court considered these arguments in its sentencing decision.  For 
instance, after hearing both parties’ arguments on Thompson’s variance request, the 
District Court observed that “considering [Thompson’s] past criminal history, the 
sentence that would ordinarily have been imposed would be, I calculate, 13 to 6 times a 
sentence previously imposed.  I think that is an inordinate disparity.”  App. 60.  In its oral 
statement of reasons, the court further explained that Thompson’s 110-month sentence 
varied from the Guideline range due to, inter alia, “disparity from [Thompson’s] previous 
sentence under his prior criminal history.”  App. 63.  The court later reiterated that 
“consideration should be given to a variance based on the career offender status as it 
overstates the criminal history and the likelihood that [Thompson] will commit future 
crimes.”  App. 66.  While Thompson may have preferred that the District Court ignore 
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the career offender Guideline in its entirety, this record satisfies us that the court did not 
abuse its discretion in declining do so.
5
 
C. 
 Thompson argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable, because it is 
“significantly greater than any relevant benchmark.”  Thompson Br. 13, 28.  A sentence 
is substantively reasonable if “the record as a whole reflects rational and meaningful 
consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 
568 (quotation marks omitted).  In this case, the District Court considered and accepted 
Thompson’s primary arguments that his criminal history overstated the seriousness of his 
offense, and that he posed a reduced risk of recidivism due in part to his poor physical 
health.  Indeed, the District Court granted a significant downward variance based on 
these arguments.  We cannot say that “no reasonable sentencing court would have 
imposed the same sentence on [Thompson] for the reasons the [D]istrict [C]ourt 
provided.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.  
IV. 
  For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of sentence. 
                                              
5
 Thompson also argues that the District Court did not “adequately” consider his 
sentencing disparity argument under § 3553(a)(6) (courts must consider “the need to 
avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have 
been found guilty of similar conduct”).  Thompson Br. 25-26.  For substantially the same 
reasons discussed above, this argument is not persuasive. 
